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SEIZURES OF PRIVATE PROPERTY IN THE




N 1984, as part of an initiative to take the profit out of crime, Congress
extended the powers of federal law enforcement agencies to seize and
forfeit the property of drug dealers.1 To provide additional funding for
the war on drugs, Congress permitted federal law enforcement agencies for
the first time to retain forfeited property for their own use.2 Since 1984 the
number of seizures and forfeitures has increased dramatically. 3 The civil in
rem forfeiture proceeding, the engine driving this new campaign against
drugs, is, however, a legal anomaly that proceeds on an archaic theory that
inanimate objects themselves can be guilty of wrongdoing.4 This theory of
guilty property produces a summary proceeding in which the innocence of
owners is not a defense; 5 owners have the burden of proof;6 and the govern-
ment, acting on the basis of rank hearsay, without notifying owners or giving
them an opportunity to be heard, and without going before a judge to secure
a warrant, can seize property from unsuspecting private owners.7 This new
* B.A., Williams College; M. Phil. in Philosophy, University of London; J.D., Harvard
Law School. Attorney at Law, Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler, New York, New York.
1. Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 853, 881 (1982 & Supp. III
1985); Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191-
209, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3374-92.
2. 21 U.S.C. § 881(e) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984, S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 216-58, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3399-40.
3. James Knapp, Deputy Associate Attorney General, Testimony before Committee on
the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Mar. 9, 1987, in Miami, Fla.
4. United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 719-20 (1971) (con-
struing Dobbin's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 399-401 (1878); The Palmyra, 25
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 1, 14 (1827)); see also Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S.
663, 683-86 (1974) (long line of cases has established that government may treat objects as
offenders and seize them, regardless of owner's innocence); Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United
States, 254 U.S. 505, 513 (1921) ("It is the illegal use that is the material consideration, it is
that which works the forfeiture, the guilt or innocence of its owner being accidental.").
5. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683-86 (1974).
6. 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1982) (burden of proof in customs law forfeitures). The Drug Con-
trol Act explicitly incorporates the procedures of customs law. 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (1982); see
Note, Due Process Implications of Shifting the Burden of Proof in Forfeiture Proceedings Arising
Out of Illegal Drug Transactions, 1984 DUKE L.J. 822, 822 (although most civil suits place
burden of proof on government, forfeiture of illegal drug cases puts burden on defendant).
7. 21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Supplemental Rules For Certain Admi-
ralty and Maritime Claims, 28 U.S.C. rule C(3) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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expansion of the scope of forfeiture provides law enforcement agencies with
the power to seize at will property of almost any description, without any
preseizure judicial review to determine whether probable cause exists.8 As
forfeiture seizures become increasingly common, the temptation increases to
conduct a forfeiture seizure of a home or a bank account under the loose
procedures approved for forfeitures and thereby avoid the strictures of the
warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. 9 Because of the extremely
broad scope of forfeiture laws, their summary procedures threaten not only
drug dealers, but innocent third parties. 10
This Article examines some recent cases that challenge, under the fourth
and fifth amendments, the government's power to conduct summary forfei-
ture seizures prior to a hearing. The Article first analyzes some of the early
cases. In the early 1970s a series of lower courts held the prehearing seizure
provisions of the forfeiture statutes unconstitutional.11 In response, the
Supreme Court rebuffed these lower courts and affirmed the traditional
power of law enforcement officers to make forfeiture seizures.' 2 The law
appeared settled. Recently, however, in response to the sweeping new drug
forfeiture laws, lower courts again have begun to impose constitutional lim-
its on the power of authorities to carry out forfeiture seizures.13 These courts
8. 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a), (b) (1982 & Supp. 111 1985).
9. Cf. United States v. $39,000 in Canadian Currency, 801 F.2d 1210, 1218 (10th Cir.
1986) (civil forfeiture cases characterize inanimate objects as defendants); United States v.
Lodson, 774 F.2d 436, 440 (11th Cir. 1985). See generally Strafer, End-running the Fourth
Amendment: Forfeiture Searches ofReal Property Under Admiralty Process, 25 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 59 (1987); Note, The Forfeiture Exception to the Warrant Requirement: A Distinction
Without a Difference, 67 VA. L. REV. 1035 (1981).
10. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686-90 (1974).
11. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., Inc. v. Massa, 363 F. Supp. 1337, 1342 (D.P.R. 1973),
rev'd sub nom. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 669 (1974); United
States v. 1971 Ford Truck, Serial No. F25HRJ82180, 346 F. Supp. 613, 618-19 (C.D. Cal.
1972); City of Everett v. Slade, 83 Wash. 2d 80, 515 P.2d 1295, 1298 (1973); cf State v. One
1983 Pontiac (Joe Arave), 717 P.2d 1338, 1340 (Utah 1986), reversing State v. One Porsche 2-
Door, 526 P.2d 917, 920 (Utah 1974).
12. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680 (1974).
13. United States v. $38,000.00 in U.S. Currency, 816 F.2d 1538, 1548 (11th Cir. 1987)
(government's forfeiture complaint must allege sufficient facts to show probable cause that
connection exists between property and illegal act); United States v. $39,000 in Canadian Cur-
rency, 801 F.2d 1210, 1222 (10th Cir. 1986) (government's allegations must supply reasonable
inference that property is connected to illegal use); United States v. Real Property Located at
25231 Mammoth Circle, 659 F. Supp. 925, 927 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (warrants held invalid be-
cause not issued by neutral judicial officer and probable cause not established); United States v.
124 East North Ave., 651 F. Supp. 1350, 1356 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (no warrant for arrest in rem of
property shall issue without prior ex parte review by judicial officer); United States v. One
1980 Ford Mustang VIN 0F03D121959, 648 F. Supp. 1305, 1307 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (in forfei-
ture action government carries initial burden of proving probable cause that substantial con-
nection exists between property and illegal act); United States v. Life Ins. Co. of Va. Single
Premium Whole Life Policy, 647 F. Supp. 732, 742 (W.D.N.C. 1986) (fourth amendment
requires government to secure in rem warrant from judge or magistrate who has determined
probable cause); United States v. $128,035 in U.S. Currency, 628 F. Supp. 668, 675 (S.D. Ohio
1986) (absent exigent circumstances, seizure of real property without warrant unconstitu-
tional); In re Kingsley, 614 F. Supp. 219, 224 (D. Mass. 1985), appeal dismissed, 802 F.2d 571
(1st Cir. 1986) (standard for probable cause in § 881 forfeiture same as used in search and
seizure); United States v. Certain Real Estate Property Located at 1880 S.E. Dixie Highway,
612 F. Supp. 1492, 1497 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (no seizure of property should occur until judicial
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generally have held that, prior to the seizure of property for forfeiture, the
constitution requires at least an ex parte hearing before a judicial officer, and
that, absent such protection, the seizure provisions of the forfeiture statutes
violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment1 4 and the prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures of the fourth amendment.' 5 This
Article argues that these new court decisions are not simply recapitulations
of the earlier constitutional challenge that failed. New factors have entered
into the judicial picture that alter the balance struck in the earlier cases and
make the recent cases distinguishable from their less illustrious forebears.
I. THE CALERO-TOLEDO EXCEPTION
A. Doctrine of Sniadach and Fuentes
In the late 1960s and early 1970s the Supreme Court began striking down
state and federal statutes that permitted the seizure of property without an
adversary hearing and before judgment. 16 In Fuentes v. Shevin 17 the
Supreme Court expanded the concept of procedural due process under the
fifth amendment to cover any significant deprivation of property.18 Later,
the Court in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. 19 and other leading cases
used this expanded concept of procedural due process to stretch the notion
of a governmental taking to include government-authorized private actions
such as prejudgment replevin 2° and prejudgment garnishment,2 1 as well as
officer has reviewed complaint in ex parte proceeding). Contra United States v. A Single Fam-
ily Residence, 803 F.2d 625, 632 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (no requirement exists for detailed allega-
tions or judicial review before issuance of warrant).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." Cf United States v. Certain Real Estate Property Located at 1880 S.E. Dixie
Highway, 612 F. Supp. 1492, 1497 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (no seizure should occur until judicial
officer has reviewed complaint in ex parte hearing).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Cf In
re Kingsley, 802 F.2d 571, 577-79 (1st Cir. 1986) (government must still follow fourth amend-
ment probable cause and particularity requirements in § 881 seizures); United States v. Pap-
pas, 613 F.2d 324, 329-30 (1 st Cir. 1979) (warrantless seizure of automobile based on probable
cause justified only when seizure immediately follows occurrence that gave probable cause).
16. North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 605-08 (1975) (attachment
statute); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 603 (1974) (attachment statute); Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82-83 (1972) (prejudgment replevin); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539
(1971) (driver's license suspensions); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)
(posting of names of alleged alcoholics); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (termina-
tion of welfare benefits); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (prejudg-
ment garnishment).
17. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
18. Id. at 86. The Court stated that "[a]ny significant taking of property by the State is
within the purview of the Due Process Clause .... Id. The Court also stated that "a tempo-
rary, nonfinal deprivation of property is nonetheless a 'deprivation' in the terms of the Four-
teenth Amendment." Id. at 85.
19. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
20. 407 U.S. at 96; 395 U.S. at 340.
21. 395 U.S. at 342.
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actions that were initiated by official governmental bodies. 22 With regard to
this latter category of purely governmental takings, the Supreme Court ap-
peared to limit even more strictly the power of the authorities to seize prop-
erty without notice and a hearing.23 After the precedents of Sniadach and
Fuentes, at least one commentator expected the Court also to constrain the
types of prehearing seizures permitted by the forfeiture statutes. 24 The
Supreme Court indicated in two cases that litigants in civil forfeiture actions
would be entitled to some of the same protections as criminal defendants
under the fourth and fifth amendments. 25 In One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v.
Pennsylvania26 the Court held that the government could not rely on evi-
dence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment's warrant requirement
to sustain a forfeiture. 27 In United States v. United States Coin & Currency
28
the Court held that a defendant could invoke the fifth amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination in forfeiture cases because of the quasi-criminal
character of forfeiture statutes.29 In Coin & Currency the Court questioned
traditional forfeiture doctrine as based upon a superstition inherited from
the "blind days of feudalism."'30 Although the Court decided the case on
other grounds, it noted "the difficulty of reconciling the broad scope of tradi-
tional forfeiture doctrine with the requirements of the Fifth Amendment."' 3'
When the Supreme Court directly confronted the issue of whether prehear-
ing forfeiture seizures violated the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment, however, the Court marched backward and carved out an exception to
the doctrine of Sniadach and Fuentes.
B. The Calero-Toledo Exception
For owners seeking to protect their property interests, Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.32 presented a sympathetic set of facts and pro-
vided an unsympathetic set of facts for a government seeking to maintain its
power to seize property prior to judgment of forfeiture. In March 1971
Donovan and Loretta Olson leased a yacht from Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,
a division of Grumman. The lease appeared to have been a simple security
22. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (Georgia Department of Public Safety); Wis-
consin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) (police chief); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 261 (1970) (Commissioner of New York Social Services).
23. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. at 539-42; Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 437;
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 261.
24. Cf. Freedman, Summary Action by Administrative Agencies, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 25
(1972) (after Sniadach, Supreme Court prepared to override legislative determination that
summary seizures permissible).
25. United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 718 (1971); One 1958
Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 696 (1965).
26. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
27. Id. at 696.
28. 401 U.S. 715 (1971).
29. Id. at 717-18.
30. Id. at 721.
31. Id.
32. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
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interest.33 In May of 1972, after the Olsons had made payments for more
than a year, Puerto Rican authorities discovered two marijuana cigarettes on
board the yacht and charged one of the Olsons with possession. In July, two
months after the arrest, the government seized the yacht pursuant to a Pu-
erto Rican forfeiture statute.34 The record is unclear as to whether or not
the government already had possession of the yacht at the time of its
seizure. 35 Although the government notified the Olsons, the Olsons did not
post bond and therefore forfeited the yacht to the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico. 36 Not until the Olsons defaulted on their lease payments did Pearson
learn of the forfeiture. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico apparently had
made a good faith effort to locate and notify the owners, and Pearson did not
press the issue of lack of notice. Instead, Pearson sued in federal district
court for the return of the yacht, asserting that prejudgment seizure of the
vessel by the government was an unconstitutional deprivation of property
33. Brief of Appellant at 4, Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663
(1974) (No. 73-157).
On March 15, 1971, Pearson leased a yacht to Donovan and Loretta Olson
("Lessee") for a five-year term. The parties simultaneously executed an option
contract giving the lessee the right to purchase the yacht on thirty days' notice
at any time during the lease term, the option price diminishing over that period
at a depreciation rate equivalent to the monthly rental. At the end of the fifth
year the yacht could be purchased for $1.00.
Id.
34. The Puerto Rican statute, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2512(a)(4), (b) (1979),
provides:
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico:
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, mount or vessels, which are
used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the
transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of [controlled sub-
stances];
(b) Any property subject to forfeiture under clause (4) of subsection (a) of this
section shall be seized by process issued pursuant to Act No. 39, of June 4, 1960,
as amended, known as the Uniform Vehicle, Mount, Vessel and Plane Seizure
Act, sections 1721 and 1722 of Title 34.
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 34, § 1722 (1971), provides:
(a) The proceedings shall be begun by the seizure of the property by the
Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of the Treasury or the Police Superintendent,
through their delegates, policemen or other peace officers.
35. The case was tried in the district court on stipulated facts. Neither the published opin-
ion of the district court nor the briefs of the parties describes who was in possession of the
yacht when the government seized it. In cases in which a forfeiture follows an arrest, it is not
uncommon for the property to be in the physical possession of the authorities before a warrant
for seizure is issued. United States v. Kaiyo Maru No. 53, 699 F.2d 989, 999 (9th Cir. 1983);
cf. United States v. $8,850 in U.S. Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1983) (government held
$8,850 for 18 months before filing forfeiture hearing); United States v. Life Ins. Policy of Va.
Single Premium Whole Life Policy, 647 F. Supp. 732, 736 (W.D.N.C. 1986)(government
seized various types of property for months before filing suit). In such cases the purpose of the
warrant is to give the court jurisdiction over the property. United States v. Kaiyo Maru No.
53, 699 F.2d at 999. Since two months elapsed between the arrest of the yacht's occupant and
the seizure, it is not unlikely that during those two months the Puerto Rican authorities had
possession of the yacht.
36. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 667-68 (1974).
1988] 1115
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
without due process in violation of the fifth amendment. 37
A three-judge district court agreed with the plaintiff's contentions. 38 Re-
lying upon Coin & Currency and the line of cases under Sniadach and Fuen-
tes,39 the district court found that, on the facts of the case, no important
governmental or general public purpose existed to justify the property
seizure prior to an adequate and meaningful hearing.40 The district court
rejected the government's argument that such seizures were necessary for
effective control of narcotics. Instead, the court found that the government
had made no showing of how a prehearing confiscation aided the enforce-
ment of criminal laws, particularly given the two-month delay between the
arrest of Olson and the seizure of the yacht. 41 The Supreme Court re-
versed. 42 In a strangely formalistic opinion by Justice Brennan, the Court
upheld the constitutionality of prehearing forfeiture seizures as a type of ex-
traordinary-situation exception set forth in Fuentes. 43 Under Fuentes, a pre-
judgment seizure is constitutional if the government can satisfy a test
consisting of three factors: that the seizure secured an important govern-
mental or public interest, that a special need for a prompt action existed, and
that the government exercised strict control over its use of force." Applying
this test to the facts in Calero-Toledo, the Court held that the government
had fulfilled each of the three requirements. 4
37. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. v. Massa, 363 F. Supp. 1337, 1338 (D.P.R. 1973).
38. Id. at 1343. The plaintiff also raised another due process issue under the fifth amend-
ment: that the forfeiture constituted an unconstitutional taking from an innocent owner.
Although the Supreme Court also addressed this claim, 416 U.S. at 680-90, that ruling is not
applicable to the discussion in this Article.
39. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
40. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. v. Massa, 363 F. Supp. at 1341-43. The district court also
relied upon a recently decided district court case, United States v. One 1971 Ford Truck, Serial
No. F25HRJ82180, 346 F. Supp. 613, 619 (C.D. Cal. 1972), in which the forfeiture of a fa-
ther's truck for illegal acts committed by his son was held unconstitutional. 363 F. Supp. at
1342. State courts also have held forfeiture statutes unconstitutional. State v. One Porsche 2-
Door, 526 P.2d 917, 918 (Utah 1974) (forfeiture of car for misdemeanor drug possession un-
conscionable); City of Everett v. Slade, 83 Wash. 2d 80, 515 P.2d 1295, 1298 (1973) (requiring
preseizure notice and hearing in forfeiture action); see also State v. One 1970 2-Door Sedan
Rambler, 91 Neb. 462, 215 N.W.2d 849, 852 (1974) (dissenting opinion) (requiring preseizure
notice and hearing in forfeiture action).
41. 363 F. Supp. at 1343.
42. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 669.
43. Id. at 677.
44. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972).
First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to secure an impor-
tant governmental or general public interest. Second, there has been a special
need for very prompt action. Third, the State has kept strict control over its
monopoly of legitimate force: the person initiating the seizure has been a govern-
ment official responsible for determining, under the standards of a narrowly
drawn statute, that it was necessary and justified in the particular instance.
Id.
45. 416 U.S. at 679.
First, seizure under the Puerto Rican statutes serves significant governmental
purposes: Seizure permits Puerto Rico to assert in rem jurisdiction over the
property in order to conduct forfeiture proceedings, thereby fostering the public
interest in preventing continued illicit use of the property and in enforcing crim-
inal sanctions. Second, preseizure notice and hearing might frustrate the inter-
ests served by the statutes, since the property seized-as here, a yacht-will
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C. Discussion of Calero-Toledo
Recently, the Justice Department has relied heavily upon Calero- Toledo
as authority for the proposition that forfeiture seizures by attorneys of the
Justice Department constitute an exception to the warrant requirement of
the fourth amendment. 4 6 This interpretation also appears to represent the
position taken by the drafters of the amendments to the Supplemental Rules
of Admiralty and Certain Maritime Claims.47 One circuit court of appeals
has adopted the position as well.48 In view of the broad range of property
now subject to seizure, such as bank accounts and real property, the tempta-
tion increases to conduct a forfeiture seizure of a home under the loose pro-
cedures approved in Calero-Toledo and thereby avoid the strict requirements
set forth in the fourth amendment. It is important, therefore, that courts do
not interpret Calero-Toledo as mandating a forfeiture exception to the fourth
amendment.
A number of reasons exist to suggest that a broad interpretation of the
holding in Calero-Toledo is untenable. First, the assumption of the Court
that a prehearing seizure is a necessary prerequisite for a court's assertion of
in rem jurisdiction over property, without which the forfeiture itself could
not occur, is a curious holdover from nineteenth century admiralty jurispru-
dence. 49 Under this theory a ship on the high seas, outside the territorial
jurisdiction of a court, could not be brought within the court's jurisdiction
unless the government physically seized it pursuant to a warrant issued by
that court.50 The theory of territorial jurisdiction, upon which these courts
based their decisions, has since yielded to principles of fairness and conven-
ience to the parties.5 ' This archaic theory does not constitute a legitimate
reason to overrule the claims of individual liberties. Second, since the record
often be of a sort that could be removed to another jurisdiction, destroyed, or
concealed, if advance warning of confiscation were given. And finally, unlike
the situation in Fuentes, seizure is not initiated by self-interested private parties;
rather, Commonwealth officials determine whether seizure is appropriate under
the provisions of the Puerto Rican statutes.
Id.
46. Troland, Asset Forfeiture, 11 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL B-30 (1987).
47. Official Comment to Supplemental Rule C(3), Supplemental Rules of Certain Admi-
ralty and Maritime Claims, 28 U.S.C. rule C(3) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
48. United States v. Certain Real Estate Property Located at 4880 S.E. Dixie Highway,
No. 86-5245, slip op. 1896, 1899-1900 (11th Cir. Mar. 11, 1988); United States v. A Single
Family Residence, 803 F.2d 625, 632 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (since magistrate made probable cause
determination, government provided plaintiff with more procedural safeguards than constitu-
tion required).
49. See infra note 51.
50. Dodge v. United States, 272 U.S. 530, 532 (1926); The Merino, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
391, 401-02 (1824); The Ship Richmond v. United States, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 102, 103-04
(1815); cf. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1877) (state may exercise jurisdiction over
property within its boundaries owned by nonresidents by holding and appropriating it); Trans-
Asiatic Oil Ltd. S.A. v. Apex Oil Co., 743 F.2d 956, 960 (1st. Cir. 1984).
51. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945) (party must main-
tain presence in state such that imposition of personal jurisdiction does not offend convenience
or notions of fair play); cf. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART &
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1973) (principles of
fairness and convenience superseded limitations based on territory).
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in Calero-Toledo does not clearly state who at the time of the seizure pos-
sessed the yacht, the Court's holding is uncertain in scope. Is the jurisdic-
tional predicate only enough to justify lack of preseizure notice when the
property is already in the hands of the authorities, or does it also permit a
forcible removal of property from the hands of an owner? Although a fic-
tional seizure of property already in the government's possession to permit
the exercise of in rem' jurisdiction is one matter, an exception to the fourth
amendment is another.5 2
In Calero-Toledo the Supreme Court expressly reserved the question of
whether the Puerto Rican statute violated the fourth amendment's warrant
and probable cause requirements.53 This reservation represents the Court's
indirect statement that judges can best assess the appropriateness of a seizure
through the warrant procedure. 54 The Court actually held that a forfeiture
seizure prior to an adversarial hearing and judgment on the merits is, in
certain circumstances, constitutional.55 The Court said nothing about
whether the constitution may require ex parte judicial review before permit-
ting a seizure, as required for purposes of the fourth amendment.
Since Calero-Toledo contains limited facts and a restricted holding, the
case does not create an exception to the fourth amendment. A number of
older Supreme Court cases cited by the Court in Calero-Toledo, however,
contain facts that are less limited and holdings that are less restricted.
56
Furthermore, many lower courts, including some of the same courts that are
now striking down forfeiture seizures, apparently also have upheld the exist-
ence of a forfeiture exception to the fourth amendment.5 7 How is one to
harmonize these decisions?
II. FOUR CATEGORIES OF PROPERTY SUBJECT TO FORFEITURE
Four basic categories of property are subject to forfeiture under federal
statutes. The General Accounting Office (GAO) has established these cate-
gories clearly.58 Some lower courts have recognized this taxonomy. 59 Even
52. United States v. Kaiyo Maru No. 53, 699 F.2d 989, 999 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding
limited to situtations in which government already has seized property).
53. 416 U.S. 663, 680 n.14 (1974).
54. Comment, Forfeiture Seizures and the Warrant Requirement, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 960,
982-83 (1981).
55. 416 U.S. at 680.
56. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61 (1967) (police made valid search of car held as
evidence for forfeiture proceeding and therefore did not violate fourth amendment); Ewing v.
Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 599-600 (1950) (to protect public, government
may act without prior judicial determination); United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile,
272 U.S. 321, 330 (1926) (since government could seize articles used by taxpayers to evade tax
payments, seizure of car without hearing constitutional).
57. United States v. One 1978 Mercedes Benz, Four-Door Sedan, 711 F.2d 1297, 1302
(5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357, 368-69 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v.
One 1977 Lincoln Mark V Coupe, 643 F.2d 154, 158 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 818
(1981).
58. Report by the Comptroller General to the Honorable Joseph R. Biden, United States
Senate, Asset Forfeiture-A Seldom Used Tool in Combatting Drug Trafficking, GAO 2-3 (Apr.
10, 1981) [hereinafter Asset Forfeiture].
59. United States v. 124 E. North Ave., 651 F. Supp. 1350, 1355 (N.D. Ill. 1987); United
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when the categories are not explicitly recognized, however, it is impossible to
harmonize the holdings of the lower courts with each other and with those
of the Supreme Court, unless one recognizes that different protections are
afforded to different classes of property.
A. Contraband
The first class of property subject to forfeiture includes drugs, guns, smug-
gled goods, liquor, gambling devices, and other items the possession of
which is a crime. 6° No property right exists in such property, and its seizure
presents no fifth amendment question. This first class also includes items
that the government has deemed by statute as inherently dangerous to the
public, including putrid food or misbranded drugs.6 1 Although a property
right does exist in such articles, this right clearly is outweighed by the dan-
ger the articles pose to the public.62 The GAO report labels all such prop-
erty contraband. 63
B. Derivative Contraband
The second class of property, which the GAO report calls derivative con-
traband, 64 includes property used in the manufacture of contraband, such as
liquor stills and drug processing equipment. This class also includes vehicles
used to store and transport contraband, such as boats, airplanes, and
automobiles.65 The government usually seizes derivative contraband at the
time of arrest, along with the contraband itself.66 Both contraband and de-
rivative contraband have been subject to forfeiture by the federal govern-
ment for nearly two centuries. 67 Nearly all the cases upholding the
constitutionality of summary forfeiture proceedings involve one or both of
these two types of property. 68
C. Proceeds
The third class of property, which the GAO report labels proceeds, was
only recently made subject to forfeiture.6 9 This class includes property, usu-
ally cash, that is received in exchange or payment for drugs.70 The govern-
ment often finds such cash proceeds in the same location as illegal drugs and
States v. Life Ins. Co. of Va. Single Premium Whole Life Policy, 647 F. Supp. 732, 742
(W.D.N.C. 1986); United States v. Certain Real Estate Property Located at 4800 S.E. Dixie
Highway, 612 F. Supp. 1492, 1495 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
60. Asset Forfeiture, supra note 58, at 2-3.
61. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 600 (1950); North American
Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
62. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 599-601 (1950).
63. Asset Forfeiture, supra note 58, at 2-3.
64. Id. at 3.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1 (1827).
68. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
69. Asset Forfeiture, supra note 58, at 4; 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1982).
70. Asset Forfeiture, supra note 58, at 3.
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accordingly seizes the money pursuant to the arrest, along with any
contraband. 71
D. Derivative Proceeds
Only recently, the government also has made the fourth class, which the
GAO report calls secondary or derivative proceeds, subject to forfeiture.
This class includes almost any property with value, including corporate
stock, real estate, bank accounts, interests in legitimate businesses, insurance
policies, antiques, and art, that the accused purchases, maintains, or acquires
with the proceeds of an illegal transaction. 72
The establishment of these four classes provides clear lines for judicial
interpretation in forfeiture cases. Although distinguishing different stan-
dards of due process for different kinds of property may seem to balkanize
the constitution, this approach actually offers a principled and coherent
method of resolving the apparent inconsistencies in modern forfeiture case
law. One can interpret the decisions in forfeiture cases as a systematic deter-
mination by courts of the appropriate constitutional procedures for each
class of property subject to forfeiture.
III. CLASSIFYING FORFEITURE SEIZURES
A. Forfeiture Seizures of Contraband
Courts do not require preseizure hearings for governmental seizures of
contraband or of property that poses a danger to the public. The leading
Supreme Court case upholding this proposition is Ewing v. Mytinger & Cas-
selberry, Inc. 73 In Ewing the government, without notice or a hearing, seized
for forfeiture mislabeled drugs. The manufacturer of the drugs challenged
the seizure as an unlawful taking under the fifth amendment. The Supreme
Court rejected this contention. 74 In an opinion by Justice Douglas, the
Court analogized the forfeiture seizure of items that can cause harm to the
public to a government official's decision to arrest a suspected criminal. 75
The Court had earlier applied the same principle of protecting the public to
justify the seizure of infected meat.76 Lower courts have applied this princi-
ple to hazardous substances77 and to other articles that pose a danger to the
71. United States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357, 361 (3d Cir. 1981); Asset Forfeiture, supra note
58, at 4.
72. Asset Forfeiture, supra note 58, at 4.
73. 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
74. Id. at 600.
75. Id. at 599.
Discretion of any official may be abused. Yet it is not a requirement of due
process that there be judicial inquiry before discretion can be exercised. It is
sufficient, where only property rights are concerned, that there is at some stage
an opportunity for a hearing and a judicial determination.
Id.
76. North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 315 (1908).




Another notable fact in Ewing was that the law required the law enforce-
ment agency to secure approval for the forfeiture seizure from the Attorney
General, who brought the action in the name of the United States. The At-
torney General's preseizure review served to check the enthusiasm of an
overzealous agency. 79 The Court wrote that the Attorney General was free
to accept or decline the agency's recommendation for a seizure.80 In modern
drug forfeiture seizures the Attorney General not only reviews the request
by an agency to conduct a forfeiture seizure, but initiates the seizure him-
self.8' The constitutional questions become more difficult when the property
seized is not per se contraband, but derivative contraband.
B. Forfeiture Seizures of Derivative Contraband
The next group of cases concerns the seizure of derivative contraband,
mostly boats, airplanes, and automobiles. The cases that best illustrate this
second class of forfeiture seizures are seizures of property under 21 U.S.C.
section 881(b) or under some version of the Uniform Controlled Substances
Act.82 Under section 881(b) the Attorney General may seize property for
forfeiture when incident to an arrest for drug-related crimes or when the
Attorney General has probable cause to believe that the property has been
used or is intended to be used in violation of the Controlled Substances
Act. 83
Calero-Toledo interpreted the due process clause of the fifth amendment
as applied to a derivative proceed, a yacht. 84 Since forfeiture of such prop-
erty is incidental to the main purpose of reaching and destroying the forbid-
den drugs, liquor, or other contraband, an owner consequently possesses a
diminished interest in the property. 85 The Supreme Court in Calero-Toledo
reserved the question of whether the seizure of derivative contraband for
forfeiture constituted an exception to the fourth amendment. 86 The
Supreme Court left this question to the lower courts. Many of the lower
court cases challenging the seizure of derivative contraband under the fourth
amendment involved seizures pursuant to a lawful arrest and have been chal-
78. United States v. An Article of Device "Theramatic," 715 F.2d 1339, 1342 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
79. See Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 599 (1950); cf Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (fourth amendment protection includes inferences
being drawn from detached magistrate rather than police officers engaged in detecting crime).
80. Ewing, 339 U.S. at 599.
81. 21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (1982).
82. UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT, 9 U.L.A. 195-640 (1979 & Supp. 1987).
Many states have adopted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act in the
form of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. Comment, Rendering Illegal Behavior Un-
profitable: Vehicle Forfeiture Under the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, 8 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 471, 474 (1974).
83. 21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (1982).
84. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 676-79 (1974).
85. United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile, 272 U.S. 321, 333 (1926).
86. 416 U.S. at 680 n.14.
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lenged in the context of a suppression hearing. 87
In Carroll v. United States88 the Supreme Court found that the fourth
amendment generally requires police, when searching a car without a war-
rant, to have both probable cause and exigent circumstances. 89 Courts im-
ply the exigent circumstances requirement from the mobility of an
automobile, but the requirement still places genuine restrictions on the gov-
ernment's ability to conduct searches of automobiles. 90 The question in au-
tomobile cases is whether courts must apply the exigent circumstances part
of the Carroll test to all seizures, or whether the courts can dispense with it
in the context of a forfeiture seizure. 91
The Supreme Court has referred in dictum to the "exception to the war-
rant requirement ... which sustains a search in connection with the seizure
of an automobile for purposes of forfeiture proceedings." '92 The Fourth,
Third, and Fifth Circuits, although not expressly relying on this dictum,
appear to recognize such a forfeiture exception for derivative proceeds. 93
According to these decisions, prior to a forfeiture seizure the police must
have probable cause, but they need not show exigent circumstances. 94 Judge
Friendly, in dictum from a Second Circuit case, also adopts this view. 95 The
First Circuit appears split.96 The Ninth and Tenth Circuits, however, apply
the same rule for a forfeiture seizure as for any other search or seizure under
the fourth amendment and require a showing of both exigent circumstances
and probable cause. 97
Many commentators have criticized the distinction between search and
87. United States v. Spetz, 721 F.2d 1457, 1460 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Kemp,
690 F.2d 397, 399 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357, 361 (3d Cir. 1981);
United States v. Pappas, 613 F.2d 324, 326 (1st Cir. 1980).
88. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
89. Id. at 153-54, 156; accord Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 589-90 (1974) (although
warrant requirements for automobiles generally less stringent than homes or offices, warrant-
less searches still require exigent circumstances); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970)(only in exigent circumstances may police conduct search without prior magistrate's determi-
nation of probable cause).
90. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 460-64 (1971) (when suspect voluntar-
ily complied with police, police had known of car's location for some time, and no other person
had access to car, no exigent circumstances existed).
91. United States v. Kemp, 690 F.2d 397, 401-02 (4th Cir. 1982).
92. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 452 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93. Kemp, 690 F.2d at 401-02; United States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357, 368-69 (3d Cir. 1981);
United States v. One 1977 Lincoln Mark V Coupe, 643 F.2d 154, 158 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 818 (1981); United States v. One 1978 Mercedes Benz, Four-Door Sedan, 711 F.2d
1297, 1302-03 (5th Cir. 1983).
94. Kemp, 690 F.2d at 401-02; Bush, 647 F.2d at 368; One 1977 Lincoln, 643 F.2d at 158;
One 1978 Mercedes Benz, 711 F.2d at 1302-03.
95. United States v. Francolino, 367 F.2d 1013, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966), cert denied, 386 U.S.
960 (1967).
96. Compare United States v. Pappas, 613 F.2d 324, 327-28 (1st Cir. 1980) (absent exigent
circumstances, probable cause must exist) with United States v. One 1975 Pontiac Lemans,
Vehicle I.D. No. 2F37M56101227, 621 F.2d 444, 450 (1st Cir. 1980) (forfeiture seizure consti-
tutes exception to warrant requirement).
97. United States v. $39,000 in Canadian Currency, 801 F.2d 1210, 1219 n.8, 1220-21
(10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Spetz, 721 F.2d 1457, 1469-70 (9th Cir. 1983); United States
v. 1979 Mercury Cougar VIN 9H93H669155, 545 F. Supp. 1087, 1089-90 (D. Colo. 1982).
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forfeiture seizure as unsupported by policy or logic. 98 Whatever the merits
of these scholarly criticisms, courts have applied a weaker fourth amend-
ment standard to seizures of automobiles and boats, because such pieces of
property are easily movable and involve a diminished interest in privacy.99
It is one matter to apply a forfeiture exception for an automobile seizure, but
another to apply a forfeiture exception to the seizure of a house or a bank
account. lOO
C. Forfeiture Seizures of Proceeds and Derivative
Proceeds: New Legislation
In 1978 Congress amended the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act t01 to provide for the in rem forfeiture of property furnished
in exchange for illegal drugs or proceeds traceable to such an exchange. 102
The statute lists money, negotiable instruments, securities, and other things
of value. Courts have interpreted "other things of value" to include bank
accounts, jewelry, horses, valuable coins, and gold bullion. 10 3 In 1984 Con-
gress further amended this act to permit the forfeiture of real property. 1° 4
The civil forfeiture provisions of the Drug Abuse Prevention Act now con-
stitute the broadest of all forfeiture statutes and can reach property of almost
any description, whether a direct or indirect proceed from the sale of
98. Charney, The Need for Constitutional Protections for Defendants in Civil Penalty
Cases, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 478, 482-83 (1974); Kandaras, Due Process and Federal Property
Forfeiture Statutes; The Need for Immediate Post-Seizure Hearing, 34 Sw. L.J. 925, 939 (1980);
Strafer, Civil Forfeitures: Protecting the Innocent Owner, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 841, 861 (1985);
Comment, supra note 54, at 967; Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87
HARV. L. REV. 835, 845-48 (1974); Note, supra note 54, at 1050.
99. See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
100. See In re Kingsley, 802 F.2d 571, 580 (1st Cir. 1986) (Coffin, J., concurring) (due
process does not permit forfeiture seizure of home without prior hearing or showing of ex-
traordinary circumstances); United States v. Certain Real Estate Property Located at 4880
S.E. Dixie Highway, 612 F. Supp. 1492, 1498 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (warrantless seizure of real
property pursuant to § 881 without exigent circumstances unconstitutional).
101. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-970 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
102. Id. § 881(a)(6), as amended, reads as follows:
All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value fur-
nished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled
substance in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an ex-
change, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended
to be used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter, except that no property
shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner,
by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been commit-
ted or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.
103. United States v. $33,000 in U.S. Currency, 640 F. Supp. 898, 900 (D. Md. 1986);
United States v. Banco Cafetero Int'l, 608 F. Supp. 1394, 1403 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 797
F.2d 1154, (2d Cir. 1986).
104. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (Supp. V 1987) reads as follows:
All real property, including any right, title, and interest in the whole of any
lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or
intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the com-
mission of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by more than one year's
imprisonment, except that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph,
to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission estab-
lished by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge




Seizures of proceeds and derivative proceeds under the civil forfeiture pro-
visions of the Drug Abuse Prevention Act do not usually occur incident to
an arrest,10 6 but occur pursuant to the in rem procedures of the Supplemen-
tal Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims (Supplemental
Rules). 10 7 Rule C(3) of the Supplemental Rules states that, upon a filing of
the complaint for forfeiture, the clerk shall promptly issue a warrant for the
arrest and seizure of the property without prior certification of exigent cir-
cumstances. 08 In Ewing the government used rule C(3) to seize contraband
and was able to survive a constitutional attack.' °9 The Puerto Rican forfei-
ture statute used in Calero- Toledo does not appear to have contained a provi-
sion similar to rule C(3). Circuits that recognize a forfeiture exception to the
fourth amendment, however, would probably sustain use of rule C(3) to
seize boats, automobiles, and airplanes.110
Some courts have held the use of rule C(3) unconstitutional in the context
of the original admiralty proceedings for which the rule was first
designed.III In response to these decisions, Congress amended rule C(3) in
1985 to provide for a judicial hearing prior to the seizure of a vessel in admi-
ralty cases.'1 2 The drafters of the amendment, relying on the authority of
Calero-Toledo, specifically exempted forfeiture actions brought by govern-
ment agencies." 13 The confidence of the drafters in the constitutionality of
seizures pursuant to rule C(3) by government agencies, however, appears
well placed only with respect to the first and perhaps the second categories
105. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) with 27 U.S.C. § 206(b) (Supp. VI
1988) (forfeiture limited to alcohol); 18 U.S.C. § 924(d) (forfeiture limited to firearms).
106. In re Kingsley, 802 F.2d 571, 572-74 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v. Life Insurance
Co. of Va. Single Premium Whole Life Policy, 647 F. Supp. 732, 741-42 (W.D.N.C. 1986);
United States v. Certain Real Estate Property Located at 4880 S.E. Dixie Highway, 612 F.
Supp. 1492 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
107. Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, 28 U.S.C. rule C(3)
(1982 & Supp. V 1987).
108. Id. "In actions by the United States for forfeitures for federal statutory violations, the
clerk, upon filing of the complaint, shall forthwith issue a summons and warrant for the arrest
of the vessel or other property without requiring a certification of exigent circumstances." Id.
109. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 599 (1950).
110. Cf. Official Comment to Rule C(3), 28 U.S.C. rule C(3) (Supp. III 1985) (citing
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679 (1974)).
111. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Vessel Bay Ridge, 509 F. Supp. 1115, 1122-23 (D.
Alaska 1981), appeal dismissed, 703 F.2d 381 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 467 U.S. 1247
(1984); Karl Senner, Inc. v. MV Acadian Valor, 485 F. Supp. 287, 295 (E.D. La. 1980). Con-
tra Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Dredge Gen. G.L. Gillespie, 663 F.2d 1338, 1351 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 966 (1982). See generally 7A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE E.10,
at E-459-60 (2d ed. 1983) (since due process questions in admiralty cases different than those
in other civil cases, courts hopefully will not extend recent Supplemental Rules to admiralty);
Morse, The Conflict Between the Supreme Court Admiralty Rules and Sniadach-Fuentes: A
Collision Course?, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1, 21 (1975) (mobility of ships explains difference in
criteria for acceptable notice and hearing between admiralty and civil cases).
112. Official Comment to Rule C(3), 28 U.S.C. rule C(3) (Supp. V 1987). As the official
comment says, the purpose of this amendment "is to eliminate any doubt as to the rule's
constitutionality under the Sniadach line of cases." Id. (construing North Ga. Finishing, Inc.
v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969)).




At the same time that it passed the amendments to the in rem civil forfei-
ture statute, Congress amended the Drug Abuse Prevention Act to include a
new criminal in personam forfeiture law that permits the forfeiture of prop-
erty of the same broad types as in civil in rem forfeiture proceedings." 5 In
these forfeiture actions the government has the burden of proof, the inno-
cence of the owner is a defense, and Congress has enacted carefully consid-
ered procedural constraints on the government's ability to seize property
prior to conviction."16 Under the criminal forfeiture procedures the govern-
ment, in order to seize property prior to a criminal conviction, must make
three showings: (1) that probable cause exists to seize the property; (2) that
preseizure notice would likely render the property unavailable for forfeiture
(i.e., an extraordinary situation); and (3) that less restrictive means, such as a
bond, restraining order, or lis pendens, would not suffice to protect the gov-
ernment's interest."
7
114. United States v. $38,000.00 in United States Currency, 816 F.2d 1538, 1548 (1 1th Cir.
1987) (government's forfeiture complaint must state sufficient facts to draw nexus between
seized money and illegal act); In re Kingsley, 802 F.2d 571, 578 (1st Cir. 1986) (seizure of
home and entire contents allegedly purchased with drug proceeds more sweeping than ordi-
nary seizures); United States v. $39,000 in Canadian Currency, 801 F.2d 1210, 1220 (10th Cir.
1986) (government must support with specific facts claim that seized property related to drug
transaction); United States v. Pappas, 613 F.2d 324, 330 (1st Cir. 1980) (warrantless seizure of
property used to transport illegal items valid only in exigent circumstances); United States v.
Real Property Located at 25231 Mammoth Circle, 659 F. Supp. 925, 927 (C.D. Cal. 1987)
(probable cause required for forfeiture); United States v. 124 East North Ave., 651 F. Supp.
1350, 1354 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (§ 881 subjects to forfeiture all real estate used to facilitate com-
mission of narcotics violation); United States v. One 1980 Ford Mustang VIN OF03D121959,
648 F. Supp. 1305, 1308 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (government failed to show substantial connection
between seized property and exchange of illegal drugs); United States v. Life Ins. Co. of Va.
Single Premium Whole Life Policy, 647 F. Supp. 732, 747 (W.D.N.C. 1986) (judicial officer
must determine probable cause prior to seizure of life insurance policy bought by proceeds
from illegal drug sale); United States v. A Parcel of Real Property Commonly Known as:
3400-3410 West 16th Street, 636 F. Supp. 142, 145 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (no warrant required for
property involved in distribution of illegal drugs); United States v. $128,035 in U.S. Currency,
628 F. Supp. 668, 675 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (government may not seize real property without
warrant); cf. United States v. Certain Real Estate Property Located at 4880 S.E. Dixie High-
way, 612 F. Supp. 1492, 1496 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (preseizure hearing necessary for nonmovable
property allegedly purchased with funds from illegal drug sale).
115. 21 U.S.C. §§ 853(a), (b) (Supp. III 1985).
116. Id. §§ 853(a), (d), (e), (f).
117. Id. §§ 853(e)(2), (f) read as follows:
(e)(2) A temporary restraining order under this subsection may be entered
upon application of the United States without notice or opportunity for a hear-
ing when an information or indictment has not yet been filed with respect to the
property, if the United States demonstrates that there is probable cause to be-
lieve that the property with respect to which the order is sought would, in the
event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture under this section and that provision
of notice will jeopardize the availability of the property for forfeiture. Such a
temporary order shall expire not more than ten days after the date on which it is
entered, unless extended for good cause shown or unless the party against whom
it is entered consents to an extension for a longer period. A hearing requested
concerning an order entered under this paragraph shall be held at the earliest
possible time and prior to the expiration of the temporary order.
(f) The Government may request the issuance of a warrant authorizing the
seizure of property subject to forfeiture under this section in the same manner as
provided for a search warrant. If the court determines that there is probable
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An individual can now forfeit the same property pursuant to a criminal in
personam proceeding as in a civil in rem proceeding. The lax provisions of
rule C(3) of the Supplemental Rules governing civil in rem forfeitures, how-
ever, provide the government with a means to accomplish the same goals as
in a criminal in personam forfeiture without constraining the government
with the strictures of the criminal statute. 81 8 The U.S. Attorney may obtain
a seizure warrant simply by filing a verified complaint with the clerk. 119 The
clerk, performing a purely ministerial function, issues the warrant, and a
marshal seizes the property, whether it be a bank account or a person's
home. 120
The practical consequence of these statutes is that the U.S. Attorney now
possesses the unsupervised power to initiate seizure proceedings and to seize
virtually any property at will. The temptation increases to conduct a forfei-
ture seizure of a home under the loose procedures approved in Calero- Toledo
and thereby avoid the strict requirements of the warrant requirement of the
fourth amendment. In Calero-Toledo the Court upheld the forfeiture seizure
of a yacht without judicial approval.12 1 A broad reading of the case would
permit a local United States Attorney to conduct a forfeiture seizure, with-
out exigent circumstances, of almost any kind of property upon the individ-
ual assessment of the attorney that probable cause existed. The fourth
amendment cases require probable cause and exigent circumstances before
the government may conduct a search without judicial authorization. 122
The Supreme Court has held that the fourth amendment applies to forfeiture
seizures because of their quasi-criminal nature. 123 The fourth amendment,
however, requires that a neutral and detached judicial officer must determine
cause to believe that the property to be seized would, in the event of conviction,
be subject to forfeiture and that an order under subsection (f) of this section
may not be sufficient to assure the availability of the property for forfeiture, the
court shall issue a warrant authorizing the seizure of such property.
Id. (footnote omitted).
118, Id. § 881(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) reads as follows:
Any property subject to forfeiture to the United States under this subchapter
may be seized by the Attorney General upon process issued pursuant to the
Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims by any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction over the property, except that
seizure without such process may be made when-
(1) the seizure is incident to an arrest or a search under a search warrant or
an inspection under an administrative inspection warrant;
(2) the property subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior judgment
in favor of the United States in a criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding
under this subchapter;
(3) the Attorney General has probable cause to believe that the property is
directly or indirectly dangerous to health or safety; or
(4) the Attorney General has probable cause to believe that the property is
subject to civil or criminal forfeiture under this subchapter.
119. Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, 28 U.S.C. rule C(3)
(Supp. III 1985).
120. Id.
121. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 677 (1974).
122. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 460 (1971); see also supra notes 89-90 and
accompanying text.
123. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700-02 (1965).
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that probable cause exists before a warrant may issue. 124 The seizure of a
car allows a court to finesse and find exigent circumstances. Presented with
a seizure of a home or a bank account, however, the fourth amendment cases
collide violently with Calero-Toledo, and the incoherence in the broad read-
ing of Calero-Toledo becomes manifest.
The question presented by the sudden expansion in types of property sub-
ject to forfeiture seizure is whether courts should dilute the fourth amend-
ment or strengthen the fifth amendment. Strangely, although the 1978
amendments to the Drug Abuse Prevention Act, which first expanded the
types of property subject to forfeiture, created the logical elements for the
conflict in the case law, lower court cases did not begin to grapple seriously
with the problem until 1984. The delay appears due to the fact that, until
recently, when Congress permitted law enforcement agencies to keep for
their own use some of the property seized by their agents, 125 forfeiture ac-
tions were considered an uninteresting legal backwater. 12 6 Furthermore,
prior to 1984, forfeiture actions were not economical. The law required
agents to use funds from their own budgets to pay. for the care and mainte-
nance of any seized property, 127 and, as a result, the agents were reluctant to
make seizures. The 1984 amendments removed this disincentive and permit-
ted law enforcement personnel to keep some of the seized proceeds to pay for
the care and upkeep of the property while awaiting the outcome of legal
proceedings.128 By removing this economic disincentive, Congress also pro-
vided the law enforcement agencies with a strong economic incentive to
bring forfeiture actions. 129
Congress also mobilized the Justice Department. The government formed
a permanent committee to coordinate forfeitures between the three Justice
Department agencies involved in forfeitures: the Drug Enforcement Admin-
istration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service.130 The agencies created the National Asset Seizure and
Forfeiture Office, a division of the Marshals Service, to manage the seized
property. 13' Since 1984, the number of forfeiture seizures by Justice Depart-
124. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 564-65 (1971); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S.
410, 415-16 (1969), overruled on other grounds, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257, 270-71 (1960), overruled on other grounds sub nom. United States v.
Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 89 (1980).
125. Asset Forfeiture, supra note 58, at 15.
126. Id. at i-v.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. 21 U.S.C. § 881(e) (Supp. III 1985); Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, S.
REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 216-17, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 3399-40.
130. Memorandum of Understanding, Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture Responsibil-
ities, Jan. 16, 1984, Signed by William H. Webster, Director, FBI, Stanley E. Morris, Director,
USMS, Francis M. Mullen, Fr., Administrator, DEA, Allan C. Nelson, Commissioner, INS.
131. Id. Attorney General's Guidelines Regarding Seized and Forfeited Property, May 24,
1985, Signed by Edwin Meese, III; Memorandum from D. Lowell Jensen to All U.S. Attor-
neys and Marshals, Aug. 14, 1985; U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Marshals Service, Na-
tional Asset Seizure and Forfeiture Program, Seized Assets Management Handbook, Prepared
by Seized Asset Management Branch (Mar. 1986).
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ment agencies has mushroomed. In the late 1970s the value of government
forfeitures averaged approximately $10 million in property a year.' 32 In
1984 seizures jumped to $130 million. In 1985 they doubled to $260 million.
In 1986 the figures doubled again to over $500 million. t33
Some of the people making seizures appear to be a far cry from the disin-
terested public officials envisioned by the Supreme Court in Calero-Toledo.
A December 1986 report by the GAO13 4 cited a case in which the Drug
Enforcement Administration's (DEA) Special Agent-in-Charge in Dallas
had embellished his office with: an elegant coffee and end table set, two
walnut china cabinets filled with decorative plates and rare figurines, several
oil paintings, a video cassette recorder and console television, a stereo sys-
tem, ornamental clocks, brass lamps, and other assorted bric-a-brac. The
agent had converted this property to government use after the previous
owner had forfeited it to the federal government. 35 In congressional hear-
ings during the spring of 1987, the DEA found its agents driving seized Mer-
cedes, Cadillacs, and other luxury cars. 136
Managing the custody and eventual sale of seized property also appears to
present problems. A GAO report dated July 15, 1983, recounted the follow-
ing examples:
[The] U.S. marshal in Houston, Texas, placed a 1-day notice for the sale
of a forfeited 1961 Beechcraft Queen Air aircraft. Four days later the
marshal sold the plane for $4,000 to one of a limited group of prospec-
tive buyers who expressed interest. The plane was initially valued at
$50,000 when seized.
This type of insufficient notice was particularly disconcerting to a pri-
vate marina owner in Freeport, Texas, who stored a vessel after its
seizure in April 1981. During the holding period, the owner received
offers to buy the vessel--one was for $24,000 and two were as high as
$40,000. The owner was personally willing to bid $30,000. Although
he requested the marshal to notify him of the sale, the marshall did not
and sold the vessel and its equipment for $13,000. At the time of
seizure, the equipment had been appraised at $10,000 and the vessel had
been appraised at $140,000.1"7
The July 1983 GAO report also described massive deterioration of seized
property due to neglect of law enforcement officers. Aging, lack of care, in-
132. Asset Forfeiture, supra note 58, at 10, 12-13.
133. Stanley E. Morris, United States Marshals Service First Year Implementation of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Report to Robert W. Kastenmeier, Subcommittee
on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice, House of Representatives (Jan. 8,
1986), reprinted in In the Legislatures, 38 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2296 (Jan. 15, 1986) (excerpt
from Marshals Service reports); Testimony of James Knapp, Deputy Associate Attorney Gen-
eral, before Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Mar. 9, 1987, in Miami, Fla.
134. Report to the Honorable Lawton Chiles, United States Senate, Internal Controls-
Drug Enforcement Administration's Use of Forfeited Personal Property, GAO (Dec. 10, 1986).
135. Id.
136. Testimony of William Snider, Forfeiture Counsel, DEA, before Committee on the
Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Mar. 9, 1987, in Miami, Fla.
137. Report by the Comptroller General to the Committee on Government Operations,
House of Representatives, Better Care and Disposal of Seized Cars, Boats, and Planes Should
Save Money and Benefit Law Enforcement, GAO 27 (July 15, 1983).
1128 [Vol. 41
PRIVATE PROPERTY SEIZURES
adequate storage, and vandalism accounted for much of the loss. Such dete-
rioration and loss may be particularly distressing to an innocent owner if he
later is able to secure the return of the property.138
D. Cases Involving Proceeds and Derivative Proceeds
In the summer of 1985 the first federal district court case arose concerning
the seizure of proceeds and derivative proceeds. United States v. Certain Real
Estate Property Located at 4880 S.E. Dixie Highway'3 9 illustrates the
amount of power that the new laws have handed the Attorney General's
office. Dixie Highway involved government seizure of three pieces of prop-
erty: a motel called the Manatee Resort, a restaurant called Charlie's-in-the-
Pocket, and a boat company called Charlie's Locker, Inc., worth approxi-
mately four million dollars. The marshals making the seizure threw out ev-
eryone they found on the property, including the guests, managers, and
owners. Among the guests forced to leave was a group of teachers partici-
pating in the Martin County Teachers' retreat. Government agents searched
the guests as they left the property. The government later justified these
searches as necessary to prevent the guests from absconding with property
that had suddenly become government property.140
Apparently the government had Joseph Spina, the owner of the property,
under criminal investigation, but had not charged him with any crime. 141
Spina had purchased the property from William Keen. The government
later indicted Keen for drug offenses and alleged that Keen had originally
purchased the property with drug money. 142 Under the government's the-
ory, title had vested in the government at the time Keen purchased the prop-
erty. Since the property was an indirect proceed of drug money, Keen
possessed no power to convey it to Spina, and the property thereafter was
subject to forfeiture. ' 43 The only reason for the seizure as stated in the com-
plaint, however, was the conclusory allegation of the Assistant United States
Attorney, based upon reports and information furnished by the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation, that the real property was subject to forfeiture to the
United States of America. 44
Upon the filing of the complaint, a deputy clerk of the district court issued
the United States Attorney warrants for the seizure of the property pursuant
to the procedures outlined in supplemental rule C(3). Under the authority
of these warrants the government seized the property and ejected the guests.
Five days later, the owners of the property filed an emergency motion for the
return of the seized properties, and Judge Gonzalez heard the motion the
next day.
138. Id. at ii.
139. 612 F. Supp. 1492 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
140. Id. at 1494.
141. Id.; United States v. Spina, No. 82-6032-CR-Conzalez (S.D. Fla.) (unpublished order
dismissing indictment on July 1, 1986).
142. 612 F. Supp. at 1494.
143. 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (Supp. III 1985).
144. 612 F. Supp. at 1494.
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Seven days later, Judge Gonzalez issued an opinion striking down the
seizure as a violation of the fifth amendment under the Sniadach-Fuentes
line of cases. 145 The court interpreted Calero-Toledo to authorize warrant-
less seizures of movable property, but distinguished the case for immovable
real property, when such exigent circumstances were unlikely. 146 The court
emphasized the difference between a movable yacht and real property and
discussed the alternative, less intrusive means, such as notices of lis pendens,
available to the government to protect its interest in the property.' 47 Fi-
nally, the court dismissed the complaint for failure to allege properly and
objectively a claim for which relief may be granted and gave the government
ten days to amend. 148 Instead of amending its complaint, the government
filed notice of appeal. The government then, possibly on instructions from
higher echelons in the Justice Department, withdrew its appeal.149
Several other lower courts have followed or cited with approval Judge
Gonzalez's fifth amendment analysis in Dixie Highway.'50 In particular,
these courts have adopted Dixie Highway's distinguishing of Calero-Toledo
based on the difference between a movable yacht and immovable real prop-
erty.'' Although Judge Gonzalez did not address the fourth amendment
question in Dixie Highway, other courts can use his focus on the type of
property seized to distinguish warrantless forfeiture seizures of
automobiles.' 5 2 The decision also has the merit of being consistent with
Supreme Court cases such as Ewing that appear not to require preseizure
judicial authorization prior to a forfeiture seizure of contraband.'5 3
Although the court in Dixie Highway remained silent, it probably specu-
lated that the government may have been trying to use the civil forfeiture
laws to attack an individual suspected of criminal activity, but against whom
the government lacked sufficient evidence to bring an indictment.' 5 4 Two
days after Judge Gonzalez's decision, the Tenth Circuit, faced with a similar
problem, formulated an alternative method for resolving warrantless forfei-
145. Id. at 1495.
146. Id. at 1496.
147. Id. at 1497.
148. Id. at 1498.
149. United States v. Certain Real Property Located at 4880 S.E. Dixie Highway, 628 F.
Supp. 1467, 1469 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (Dixie Highway II), aff'd on other grounds, No. 86-5245,
slip op. 1896 (11th Cir. Mar. 11, 1988).
150. United States v. 124 East North Ave., 651 F. Supp. 1350, 1355-56 (N.D. Ill. 1987);
United States v. Life Ins. Co. of Va. Single Premium Whole Life Policy, 647 F. Supp. 732, 741
(W.D.N.C. 1986); United States v. A Parcel of Real Property Commonly Known as: 3400-
3410 West 16th Street, 636 F. Supp. 142, 145 (N.D. Ill. 1986); United States v. $128,035 in
U.S. Currency, 628 F. Supp. 668, 674 (S.D. Ohio 1986).
151. United States v. A Parcel of Real Property Commonly Known as: 3400-3410 West
16th Street, 636 F. Supp. at 145; United States v. 124 East North Ave., 651 F. Supp. at 1355-
56.
152. 612 F. Supp. at 1496.
153. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 598 (1950).
154. United States v. Spina, No. 82-6032-CR-Connalez (S.D. Fla.) (unpublished order dis-
missing indictment on July 1, 1986); cf United States v. $39,000 in Canadian Currency, 801
F.2d 1210, 1219 (10th Cir. 1986) (government's act of freezing suspect's assets through 10%
civil forfeiture statutes while criminal investigation continues causes grave concern).
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ture seizures. In United States v. $39,000 in Canadian Currency 15 the court
did not reach the question of the constitutionality of the forfeiture statute,
but construed the pleading requirements of supplemental rule E(2)(a)15 6 so
as to avoid the constitutional question. 157 Rule E(2)(a) directs that the com-
plaint in a forfeiture case shall state the circumstances from which the case
arises with such particularity as to enable the defendant and claimant to
frame responsive pleadings. 158 In the three consolidated cases that com-
prised Canadian Currency, the government's complaint against the property
made the conclusory allegation that the property was subject to forfeiture
under 21 U.S.C. section 881(a). The government alleged no specific facts as
to why this property was subject to forfeiture. The court held that the gov-
ernment's pleadings had failed to meet the particularity requirements of sup-
plemental rule E(2)(a). 159
The Tenth Circuit's holding partially constitutes an exercise in technical
jurisprudence to avoid a serious constitutional question, but the decision also
has some teeth. In the usual civil in rem drug forfeiture case, the government
prefers to file a complaint with conclusory allegations because concurrent
parallel comprehensive criminal investigations often are proceeding. 16° In
such circumstances, as the Tenth Circuit noted, the criminal rather than the
civil forfeiture provisions are appropriate. 16 1 By strictly construing against
the government the particularized pleading requirements of supplemental
rule E(2)(a), a court avoids resolving the tension between the fifth amend-
ment cases and the fourth amendment cases. 162 The Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals also has adopted this mode of analysis. 163 Since filing particular-
ized pleadings is a simple matter and the government continues to bring civil
forfeiture cases without tandem criminal proceedings, this approach only
postpones resolution of the difficult constitutional issue.
The First Circuit was the first court to adopt a third, and perhaps most
popular, line of analysis. In its decision affirming a lower court's ruling that
the government return seized property to its owner, the First Circuit indi-
155. 801 F.2d 1210 (10th Cir. 1986).
156. Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, 28 U.S.C. rule
E(2)(A) (1982).
157. 801 F.2d at 1219 n.8.
158. Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, 28 U.S.C. rule
E(2)(A) (1982).
In actions to which this rule is applicable the complaint shall state the circum-
stances from which the claim arises with such particularity that the defendant or
claimant will be able, without moving for a more definite statement, to com-
mence an investigation of the facts and to frame a responsive pleading.
Id.
159. Canadian Currency, 801 F.2d at 1220-22.
160. Id. at 1218.
161. Id. at 1219 n.7. "Although the issue is not squarely presented in this case, the whole-
sale use of civil forfeiture proceedings causes us grave concern when the Government has
clearly focused its law enforcement energies and resources upon a person and attempts to
restrain his property in anticipation of formal criminal proceedings." Id.
162. Id. at 1219 n.8.
163. United States v. Certain Real Property Located at 4880 S.E. Dixie Highway, No. 86-
5245, slip. op. 1896 (1 1th Cir. Mar. 11, 1988); United States v. $38,000 in U.S. Currency, 816
F.2d 1538, 1547-48 (1ith Cir. 1987).
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cated in dictum that forfeiture seizures pursuant to the Supplemental Rules
violated the fourth amendment. 164 In In re Kingsley 165 the government, on
the basis of a secret affidavit, obtained a warrant from a magistrate for the
seizure of all Kingsley's worldly goods, including his home, his girlfriend's
car, her diamond ring, his clothes, food, toothbrush, dogs and cockateel, and
several bank accounts, on the theory that Kingsley purchased all of his pos-
sessions with the proceeds of illegal drug sales. The government moved to
impound the affidavits on the theory that disclosure of the affidavits would
jeopardize the government's long-term investigation into the illegal narcotics
activities of individuals mentioned in the affidavits. The government as-
serted that it could have conducted the seizure without a warrant, and there-
fore a seizure pursuant to a clerk's warrant did not violate the fourth
amendment. The district court rejected the government's greater-includes-
the-lesser argument, holding that the forfeiture statute still required the re-
view of a detached judicial officer before the clerk could issue a warrant. 166
The district court ordered Kingsley's possessions returned to him, but en-
tered a preliminary injunction against Kingsley, restraining him from alien-
ating the property pending the forfeiture proceeding. 167 Upon the
government's appeal, the First Circuit affirmed. 168 Two of the three judges
on the panel, however, would have applied an even more stringent test than
the district judge. Judge Coffin wrote that due process required that the
government demonstrate to a magistrate that preseizure notice would render
the property unavailable and that a less restrictive means of protecting the
governmental interest in the property did not exist. 169 Judge Coffin cited for
authority the criminal forfeiture procedures, although the government
brought the case under the civil in rem forfeiture procedures of section
164. In re Kingsley, 802 F.2d 571, 578 (1st Cir. 1986).
165. Id.
166. In re Kingsley, 614 F. Supp. 219, 223 (D. Mass. 1985). The court stated:
[I]f the government had merely gone before the clerk of the court as Rule C of
the Supplemental Rules provides and procured a warrant for the arrest of peti-
tioner's property upon the filing of a verified complaint, would that procedure-
without more-be legal? The Court has concluded that it would not. The
Court holds that it is necessary in § 881 cases for a magistrate or other detached
judicial officer to review the clerk's warrant prior to its issuance to insure it
satisfies the Fourth Amendment's requirements of probable cause and
particularity.
Id.
167. Id. at 226.
168. 802 F.2d at 579.
169. Id. at 580. Judge Coffin wrote:
I also agree with my brother Torruella that the government's seizure of Kings-
ley's home in this case violated due process. Prior to initiating the preindict-
ment seizure of a home pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881, the government must be
required to demonstrate before a magistrate that preseizure notice would likely
render the property unavailable for forfeiture and that less restrictive means to
protect the legitimate governmental interest in the property do not exist. Absent
such extraordinary circumstances, due process does not permit the government
to initiate the forfeiture of a home by preindictment seizure without first afford-
ing the opportunity for an adversary hearing.
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
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881.170 Like the court in Canadian Currency, Coffin appeared concerned
that the government had used the civil forfeiture procedures to avoid the
more stringent procedures of the criminal forfeiture laws, with the intention
to punish the owner.1 7 1 In his dissent Judge Torruella agreed with the ma-
jority's decision to affirm the district court's order that the government re-
turn Kingsley's property, but felt that the court should have found a
substantive denial of due process in order to dismiss the government's case
altogether. 172
The Kingsley court's analysis resolved the problem posed by Calero-To-
ledo by rendering the fifth amendment analysis of due process almost irrele-
vant to forfeiture seizures. The analysis implied that, at least in the case of
forfeiture seizures, citizens possess greater rights under the fourth amend-
ment than under the fifth amendment. The question remains, however, of
whether the Kingsley court intended to overrule sub silentio its holding in
United States v. One 1975 Pontiac Lemans,173 which held a warrantless
seizure of an automobile used in bookmaking constitutional. 74 One might
interpret Judge Torruella's favorable citation to Dixie Highway 175 as indicat-
ing a less hostile, if not different, result in the next case of an automobile
seizure.
V. CONCLUSION
The 1984 amendments placed an enormous amount of power in the gov-
ernment's hands and gave the government an incentive to abuse that power.
The facts in some of the cases are so egregious that the government, at least
in one instance, has proven reluctant to appeal adverse decisions. 176 Many
cases border on violations of substantive due process. 177
When litigants challenge governmental seizures of property pursuant to
rule C(3), courts sometime merely dismiss the government's complaint with-
out prejudice to refile, or quash the warrant without prejudice to reapply for
a new one.1 78 Since the government can present evidence to show probable
cause at the hearing on the constitutionality of the seizure, the government
may be able to show the court that probable cause exists to issue a judicial
warrant before being required to return the property. This fact permits the
170. Id.
171. Cf. United States v. $39,000 in Canadian Currency, 801 F.2d 1210, 1219 (10th Cir.
1986).
172. In re Kingsley, 802 F.2d at 581.
173. 621 F.2d 444 (1st Cir. 1980).
174. Id. at 450.
175. 802 F.2d at 582 (citing Dixie Highway, 612 F. Supp. 1492 (S.D. Fla. 1985)).
176. Dixie Highway II, 628 F. Supp. 1467, 1469 (S.D. Fla. 1986), aff'd on other grounds,
No. 86-5245, slip op. 1896 (11th Cir. Mar. 11, 1988).
177. In re Kingsley, 614 F. Supp. 219, 226 (D. Mass. 1985) ("Such an intrusion borders on
a substantive due process violation, cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), and the
public interest demands it be redressed.").
178. United States v. 124 East North Ave., 651 F. Supp. 1350, 1357 (N.D. Ill. 1987);
United States v. $128,035.00 in U.S. Currency, 628 F. Supp. 668, 676 (S.D. Ohio 1986). Con-
tra United States v. A Parcel of Real Property Commonly Known as: 3400-3410 West 16th
Street, 636 F. Supp. 142, 147 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
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government to correct its behavior without suffering a penalty for violation
of the constitution. The lawyers for the owners, faced with the likelihood
that they will achieve little by a motion to quash or a motion to dismiss on
grounds of an illegal seizure, may consider filing the motion as a waste of
time.
In Dixie Highway Judge Gonzalez permitted the government to refile its
complaint, but also required the government to pay attorneys' fees and dam-
ages to the owners.' 79 This penalty appeared to create an effective method
to halt governmental abuses. If failure to follow constitutional procedures
will result in a stiff judgment for attorneys' fees, the government may use
more care. Payment of attorneys' fees is possible under Federal Civil Proce-
dure Rule 11180 and under the Equal Access to Justice Act. 81 Common law
also allows civil damages in certain circumstances.' 8 2 Absent such a pen-
alty, however, nothing prevents law enforcement officers from continuing to
circumvent the criminal process through the use of seizure warrants issued
under supplemental rule C(3).
The driving force behind the surge in the number of forfeiture abuses ap-
pears to be the provision of the law permitting the law enforcement officials
to keep seized property.' 8 3 This provision and the expansion of types of
property now subject to government forfeiture provide law enforcement offi-
cials with vast new powers and incentives. Upon the U.S. Attorney's assess-
ment of probable cause, the government may seize private property. Few, if
any, limitations exist on the government's power to make seizures under the
drug statutes. A preseizure judicial review would place a minimal burden on
law enforcement officers, provide an important safeguard against erroneous
deprivations of property, and meet the constitutionally required constraint
on what is otherwise the unrestricted power of the government to seize pri-
vate property under the ancient name of forfeiture.
179. Dixie Highway, 612 F. Supp. at 1498; Dixie Highway 11, 628 F. Supp. at 1472.
180. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
181. Title II, Pub. L. No. 96-481, §§ 201-208, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980), extended and amended,
Pub. L. No. 99-80, 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (99 Stat.) 132 (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), 15 U.S.C. § 643b (1982 & Supp. III 1985),
28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)); see also
Dixie Highway 11, 628 F. Supp. at 1471-72; Lee v. Johnson, 801 F.2d 115, 116-17 (3d Cir.
1986) (awarding attorneys' fees discourages unnecessary litigation, thereby implementing poli-
cies of Equal Access to Justice Act), aff'd on other grounds, No. 86-5245, slip. op. 1896 (1 1th
Cir. Mar. 11, 1988).
182. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
395 (1971) (damages may be obtained from government for injuries consequent upon violation
of fourth amendment).
183. See supra notes 129-38 and accompanying text.
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